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We suggest to use information from the state register of personal cars as an alternative indicator of
economic inequality in countries with a large share of shadow economy. We illustrate our approach using
the Latvian pool of personal cars. Our main ﬁnding is that the extent of household economic inequality
in Latvia is much larger than oﬃcially assumed. The latest oﬃcially available estimate of the Gini
coeﬃcient is 0.36 for 2005, which is much lower than 0.55 for 2009 reported in our paper.
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1 You are what you drive.
1 Introduction
Economic inequality of the households is an important characteristic of the welfare of a country. Societies
experiencing too high inequality might be subject to increased levels of criminality, drug and alcohol con-
sumption as well as political instability. Moreover, excessive inequality can have detrimental consequences
for economic growth.1 Governments pursue various redistributive policies in order to lessen (excessive) in-
equality among households. However, reliable indicators are needed in order to evaluate the current stance
of economic inequality as well as to monitor progress of such policies.
A typical way of how economic inequality is measured is by means of household budget surveys. The data
are collected from a limited number of representative households, which are asked to ﬁll in the questionnaires
including various questions concerning their expenditure and income. While such a practice of data collection
is widespread, there is a number of problematic issues: 1) Only a limited number of households are selected
(invited) to participate. 2) The participation is voluntary and veriﬁcation of supplied information is costly
and may not always be possible. 3) The voluntary surveys suﬀer from the so-called “middle-class bias”
(Becker and Hauser, 2003) when households with very high and very low income levels typically are not
suﬃciently represented.
In countries with a large share of underground economy this type of data collection, that is largely based
on voluntary participation, may be more problematic than in developed economies with a good functioning
state. In the former countries due to the fact that a lion share of income is derived from unreported economic
activity, the respondents may tend to under report their true expenses/earned income in interviews or be
less motivated to take part in these surveys. Hence, in those countries one would expect that the reported
picture may be more distorted than that in developed countries.
In the current paper we suggest an alternative indicator of economic inequality based on information from
a state register of personal cars. In contrast to surveys, where participation is voluntary and veriﬁcation of
provided responses is costly (and if possible at all), the accuracy of information on possessed cars is easy to
verify and therefore it is not in the best interests of respondents to provide inaccurate or false statements.
Our suggestion is based on the perception that personal cars because of their intrinsic characteristics are
not only means of transportation but also an important device that can be (and widely) used for signaling
of social status and hence of economic well-being of their owners. In this respect cars distinguish themselves
from other durable goods like washing machines and refrigerators that are kept behind closed doors and
therefore are diﬃcult to use to impress other people unless one invites them home. It is reasonable to expect
that with a rising level of income/wealth a representative household will be able to aﬀord a better and more
expensive car and, more importantly, he/she will do so in order to signal it to his/her surrounding.
The use of personal cars as a signaling device may be even more pronounced in countries of Eastern
1Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) provide an extensive review of literature on inequality and its socio-economic impact.
2Europe where until the breakdown of the Soviet Union personal cars were one of the most desirable but
often unattainable to common people consumer goods. Unsurprisingly that in the aftermath of the fall of
the Soviet block, one of the ﬁrst things that inhabitants did is to satisfy their for a long time suppressed
wishes to own a car.
We illustrate the use of information on registered cars for measuring economic inequality using Latvian
data as an example. Our choice of Latvia is not purely accidental. Latvia is a small Eastern European
country that regained its independence in 1991. Since independence Latvians were very active in acquiring
personal cars. In the period from 2000 until 2009 the number of registered cars increased from 299,205 to
about 510,000, peaking to 537,866 in 20072. Interestingly, the total population has declined by about 7%
from 2,377,383 (2000 population census) to 2,217,969 (July 2010 estimate)3 of people in the same period.
This indicates that cars is a popular consumer good that is aﬀordable for a wide range of Latvian people
with diﬀerent incomes and tastes. More importantly, in Latvia there is a substantial share of underground
economy. Schneider et al. (2010, p. 23) estimate that in the period 1999—2007 the average size of shadow
economy was 29.2 percent of Latvian GDP. The two countries with the smallest shares of shadow economy
among considered 21 transition counries are the Slovak and Czech Republics. Ukraine and Georgia are
countries with the largest shares, 49.7% and 65.8%, respectively. In addition, because of devastating eﬀects
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis—it is estimated that during 2008-2009 the Latvian GDP cumulatively declined
by about 25%—and the associated austerity packages implemented by the government (including raise in
VAT and other taxes) it is very likely that the share of underground activity in Latvia did not diminish but
rather increased in the recent period.
The use of car prices for measuring economic inequality was earlier advocated in a pioneering study
of Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2010). The authors show that in Germany regional measures of economic
inequality based on the oﬃcial data are highly correlated with inequality measures based on regional car
prices posted on the Internet. Moreover, it has been also found that there is a rather high correlation between
the oﬃcial estimates of regional income levels and recorded average regional car prices, suggesting that in
relatively poor federal (eastern) states people tend to demand smaller and cheaper cars than in more well-oﬀ
western federal states.
The novelty proposed in this paper is that we utilize the information contained in the state register of
personal cars in Latvia for measuring economic inequality among households. For every reported car (make,
model, year of production) we approximate its value by prevailing market price. By matching cars with
their corresponding prices we are able to construct a proxy for economic well-being of Latvian households
that we can use for measuring economic inequality. In contrast to oﬃcial measures of income inequality
our method does not have any signiﬁcant publication lag and it is very inexpensive. We also show how to
take into account inherent uncertainty in pricing of the cars by constructing conﬁdence intervals around our
estimates of economic inequality.
2Data are for cars that passed the compulsory technical examination.
3https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lg.html
32 Data
The data on personal cars registered in Latvia were graciously provided by the Latvian Road Traﬃc Safety
Directorate (CSDD). The car pool comprises those cars that were registered on the 31th December 2009.
Only those cars were included that passed the compulsory technical examination. The data are anonimised
and highly aggregated. We have only the following information at our disposal: car make, name of a
model, year of production, owner type (private or organization), and the corresponding number of cars.
Unfortunately, any information either on mileage or engine volume is absent.
In total, 510,959 personal cars were registered on the 31th December 2009 in Latvia. For our estimations
we retained only those cars that were built starting from 1980. The reason for such a choice is twofold. First,
it is quite diﬃcult to evaluate older cars since there is not much price information available. Second, given
their age it is very likely that such cars are not that much used for everyday traveling but perhaps are mainly
kept for other reasons. We also removed from our sample military cars like Hummer HMMWVM1151 or VW
ILTIS, since it was also quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd prices for such cars. Fortunately, there were not so many of
those. In the end we were left with 508,701 cars. These cars were registered both by private persons as well
as legal entities (commercial ﬁrms and organizations). In practice, it is quite diﬃcult, however, to separate
the use of cars for private rather than for business purposes. Hence our ﬁrst set of the results is based on
all cars. We check the robustness of our results by estimating the level of inequality using cars registered by
private persons only.
The data on car prices were downloaded from the popular German Internet site hosting car selling
advertisements (www.mobile.de) in May 2010. In total we collected 873,796 unique price quotes. We
use this rich source of information in order to determine an approximate value of each car registered in
Latvia by matching the following car characteristics (make, model, production year) in the register with the
corresponding information posted in this website.
3 Results
In this section we present our results. First we describe the results obtained using all cars registered both
to persons and organizations, see Table 1. Then we brieﬂy report the results obtained using a subset of cars
registered to persons, see Table 2.
The bottom line of Table 1 reports that there were 508,701 personal cars registered in Latvia with the
earliest year of production 1980 (the stand of 31st December, 2009). Using the website (www.mobile.de)
we did not ﬁnd any price for 12,562 of them which comprises about 2.5%. For the rest of the cars we
could ﬁnd at least one price quotation. For those cars for which we did not ﬁnd any prices, we had to
use the available information in order to ﬁnd out a reasoble price for them. In order to do this we used
car categories speciﬁed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Car classiﬁcation. Observe that in our approach we
mixed both classiﬁcations referred to as American English and British English in this website. From each
classiﬁcation we picked up the most detailed breakdown of cars. For example, in the American English
4classiﬁcation the “subcompact” class of cars includes “city car” and “supermini” categories of the British
English classiﬁcation, such that in table reporting the estimation results we used these two categories instead
of one. In addition, we distinguished between four subcategories of the “sports” cars. The reasons for doing
so is that this category of cars is very heterogenous: on the one hand we have a low-prices sports cars like
HYUNDAI SCOUPE, on the other hand—rather expensive cars like LAMBORGHINI MURCI´ ELAGO.
The left panel of Table 1 provides a breakdown of cars according to the mentioned categories. The
largest category of the cars is “compact” followed by “mid-size”. Also cars belonging to the “entry lux” and
“mid-size lux” categories are quite popular in Latvia. The column “Non-matched” reports a number of cars
in each category for which we could not ﬁnd a single price. In general we were unable to match prices for
older cars that are no longer sold in Germany, Soviet-made cars (like UAZ in “mini SUV”), and American
cars (like CHEVROLET LUMINA or DODGE INTREPID in “full-size”).
Since we only dispose of a very aggregated information on each car, its evaluation is necessary confronted
with inherent uncertainty that we have to account for. Fortunately for most cars with known for us char-
acteristics (make-model-year of production) we have more than a single price observation. For example, for
VW GOLF produced in 2008 we have 419 registered cars and 4190 corresponding price quotations. We use
these multiple price observations in order to approximate this uncertainty. In order to compute a value of
Gini coeﬃcient we assign prices to cars by the following two procedures. For the sake of illustration we
continue with the example of VW-GOLF-2008. In the ﬁrst procedure we randomly draw (with replacement)
a vector of size 419 from available 4190 prices such that each of 419 registered cars gets assigned its own
price. We repeat this procedure for every model in our sample, which in the end gives us a vector of assigned
prices of length corresponding to the total number of cars (508,701). Now we can use this vector of assigned
prices in order to compute Gini coeﬃcient. In the second procedure we randomly draw only one price from
available 4190 prices and assign this price to each of 419 cars. Then we repeat this procedure for every
model in our sample and subsequently compute Gini coeﬃcient. We repeat each of the two procedures 100
times. As a result we have a distribution of Gini coeﬃcient values. We report the descriptive statistics of this
distribution in Table 1 in columns (4)—(7) and (8)—(11) for the ﬁrst and second procedures, respectively.
We also use these two procedures in order to assign prices to 12562 cars for which we could not ﬁnd
a single price observation. For those cars without matched prices we assigned a price by exploiting our
knowledge about a category to which it belongs and a year of production. According to the ﬁrst procedure
we draw a vector of size corresponding to a number of cars from a set of prices for those cars that were
build in the same year and belong to the same class. According to the second procedure we randomly draw
a single price from the mentioned set of prices and assign this price to every car with these characteristics.
Estimation results for all car categories are reported in the last row of Table 1. The mean values of the
obtained distribution of Gini coeﬃcients computed by these two approaches are practically the same (0.551,
subject to rounding). However, the standard deviations of the respective distributions diﬀer. In the ﬁrst
procedure the variation is negligible (observed maximal and minimal values of Gini coeﬃcients are 0.552
and 0.550, and the standard deviation is 0.000), whereas the second approach yields maximal and minimal
values of 0.591 and 0.544, with the standard deviation of 0.007. A similar conclusion can be reached when
5comparing estimation results for car classes.
In order to check the robustness of our results we replicated these two procedures using cars registered
only on physical persons, see Table 2. The sample size reduces to 428,972 cars, and for 11411 cars we could
not ﬁnd a single price observation. The mean values of the Gini coeﬃcient are 0.534 and 0.533 for the ﬁrst
and second procedures, respectively. These values are very close to those reported for the whole car pool.
The car-based evaluation of income inequality can (and should) be compared to oﬃcial measures based
on household budget surveys. The survey-based measures of Gini coeﬃcients available to us are for years
1988 (0.225, Rauhmane et al., 2010), 1997 (0.338, Fofack and Monga, 2004), 2000 (0.373, Fofack and Monga,
2004), and 2005 (0.360, CIA, 2011). In 1988 Latvia still was a part of the Soviet Union and that explains
a rather low value of the Gini coeﬃcient. In post-Soviet period the value of the Gini coeﬃcient somewhat
stabilized around 0.35, which is much lower than we reported above in Tables 1 and 2.
In sum, our approach to measuring the economic inequality among Latvian households suggests that it
is much more pronounced than oﬃcially reported. It is interesting to note that the reported value of the
Gini coeﬃcient is practically the same whether we use all the cars registered to both physical persons and
legal entities or only those cars registered to physical persons. The main argument for using our approach
for measuring inequality in countries with a formidable share of shadow economy is that on the one hand
respondents generally are less motivated to disclose their true levels of income/expenses in interviews than
in countries with smaller levels of underground activity. On the other hand, it is in their best interests to
accurately report to the register of the road police what car do they drive.
However, our approach is based on several assumptions which will be discussed below. We also will
speculate on likely consequences for estimated values of the Gini coeﬃcient in case these assumptions are
likely to be violated. The ﬁrst assumption that we made that there is only one car per household. This
certainly may true for families with lower income but may be not hold for richer families, where both husband
and wife may each have a car to drive. Although we do not have any information on car ownership per
household, we can conjecture that if we could account for that this resulted even in higher values of the Gini
coeﬃcient.
Our second major assumption is that there is no sample selection bias in car ownership. Although it
is not diﬃcult to imagine households that for some reasons choose not to own a car. For example a single
pensioner, who struggles to pay his monthly rent, surely cannot aﬀord it. Or, a green-minded well-oﬀ family
that on purpose decided not to have a car because of environmental concerns and choose to use the public
transportation instead. Accounting for those people who cannot aﬀord a car in our approach is equivalent of
adding very low prices to those prices that we already have. In doing that we are likely to increase further
value of the Gini coeﬃcient. With respect to those people that choose not to own a car because of other
than ﬁnancial reasons, we argue that in Latvia those people are rather exception than the rule: in fact in
Latvia, those who can aﬀord a car—buy it. As said above, a car is a common good in Latvia that oﬀers
great variety both concerning price and buyers’ taste, and it is very helpful for social signaling.
Our third assumption is that there is that the elasticity of expenditure on car with respect to income is
positive and close to unity. We also implicitly assume that households with a similar income spent a similar
6share of their budget on car. Again it is diﬃcult to judge to what extent it holds in Latvia, as those with less
income may be tempted to spend a larger share of their income on a car in order to appear better oﬀ than
actually he is. At the same time, very rich households may spend a smaller share of their income on their
cars than does an average household. For example, instead of buying a LAMBORGHINI MURCI´ ELAGO
they may settle for a PORSCHE PANAMERA. Accounting for tendency of relatively poor households to
over-spent and of better-oﬀ households to under-spent on cars is likely further to increase value of Gini
coeﬃcient in our approach.
In our car evaluation exercise we deployed German prices. In doing so we implicitly assume that the price
structure at the German car market is similar to that in Latvia. To the certain extent this seems to be not far
away from the truth as most of the (second-hand) cars are imported to the Latvian market from Germany.
An advantage of using the German prices is that it helps us directly match prices to a corresponding car
for more than 97% of the registered cars. As an alternative we could have used the local prices in order
to determine an approximate price for a car. But compared to almost 900,000 price quations available in
Germany, there is only about 4,500 prices that we could ﬁnd at the Latvian website (www.ss.lv) with car
sale announcements. This number is substantially smaller implying that for a large portion of cars it is not
possible to directly ﬁnd the corresponding prices. Moreover, German prices are also more heterogeneous for
a given set of characteresitcs (make—model—year of production) that we have at our disposal, allowing us
better to account for evaluation uncertainty of cars with these characteristics.
Finally, we acknowledge that the prices placed on the web are not the end selling but oﬀer prices. The
former prices can naturally deviate from the latter but we do not have any information by how much.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we suggest an alternative method of measuring the extent of economic inequality between
households. Rather than directly asking (a subset of) households regarding their incomes and expenditures,
we suggest to infer indirectly their incomes by assessing an approximate value of their cars. We expect
that our method delivers more precise results especially in countries where a lion share of income is derived
from underground activity. In those countries we expect that the respondents are less likely to provide true
answers during the interviews or are less motivated to participate in the budget surveys at all. As a result,
inequality measures based on household budget surveys are likely to be downwards biased. In contrast, our
approach is based on accurate and easy veriﬁable information reported by the respondents to the road police
register about the cars they own.
As an illustration of our approach we use Latvian data on car ownership. For each car model we assign
a corresponding price using information from the Internet advertisements placed on the popular German
website with car advertisements. We compute the Gini coeﬃcient based on the assigned car prices and ﬁnd
out that our estimates of Gini coeﬃcient are much higher than those reported on the basis of household
budget surveys. The latest oﬃcially available estimate of Gini coeﬃcient is 0.36 for 2005, which is much
lower than 0.55 reported in our paper.
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8Table 1: Results obtained for all cars
Number Gini coefficient (I) Gini coefficient (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Non-matched Non-matched, % mean st.dev max min mean st.dev max min
Microcar 144 0 0.0 0.193 0.010 0.220 0.170 0.186 0.028 0.261 0.136
City car 4207 177 4.2 0.401 0.002 0.407 0.396 0.396 0.015 0.440 0.364
Supermini 23044 375 1.6 0.381 0.001 0.383 0.379 0.382 0.007 0.401 0.368
Compact 127621 5761 4.5 0.518 0.000 0.519 0.516 0.518 0.008 0.551 0.500
Entry lux 72395 175 0.2 0.528 0.001 0.530 0.527 0.528 0.014 0.562 0.492
Mid-size 100068 910 0.9 0.561 0.001 0.563 0.559 0.560 0.010 0.594 0.539
Mid-size lux 65507 636 1.0 0.530 0.002 0.536 0.524 0.532 0.033 0.733 0.508
Full-size 1425 548 38.5 0.456 0.006 0.475 0.439 0.450 0.021 0.504 0.394
Full-size lux 7515 66 0.9 0.581 0.002 0.587 0.573 0.580 0.007 0.599 0.559
Sports (low) 701 26 3.7 0.394 0.004 0.408 0.382 0.390 0.016 0.427 0.351
Sports (mid) 207 4 1.9 0.301 0.008 0.325 0.284 0.302 0.015 0.344 0.263
Sports (high) 72 5 6.9 0.180 0.010 0.207 0.149 0.173 0.016 0.218 0.144
Sports (lux) 138 3 2.2 0.412 0.019 0.492 0.382 0.408 0.018 0.453 0.370
Super 6 2 33.3 0.312 0.081 0.477 0.121 0.237 0.045 0.346 0.137
Ponycar 124 3 2.4 0.361 0.017 0.400 0.312 0.357 0.030 0.443 0.298
Grand tourer 424 17 4.0 0.472 0.004 0.482 0.465 0.472 0.007 0.490 0.456
Convertible 3804 5 0.1 0.410 0.003 0.415 0.403 0.404 0.022 0.451 0.329
Roadster 501 3 0.6 0.344 0.006 0.359 0.330 0.342 0.012 0.371 0.315
LAV 7814 7 0.1 0.290 0.001 0.293 0.286 0.288 0.009 0.317 0.269
Mini MPV 4039 252 6.2 0.256 0.002 0.260 0.251 0.254 0.009 0.279 0.233
Compact MPV 11848 183 1.5 0.342 0.001 0.345 0.340 0.340 0.008 0.355 0.319
Large MPV 22124 2072 9.4 0.448 0.001 0.450 0.445 0.447 0.008 0.474 0.429
Full-size van 3212 89 2.8 0.449 0.003 0.456 0.442 0.448 0.021 0.517 0.403
LCV 10710 85 0.8 0.457 0.002 0.461 0.452 0.455 0.011 0.490 0.428
Mini SUV 2758 395 14.3 0.399 0.003 0.406 0.390 0.397 0.012 0.434 0.360
Compact SUV 16708 237 1.4 0.322 0.001 0.324 0.319 0.321 0.005 0.339 0.309
Coupe SUV 193 0 0.0 0.270 0.008 0.285 0.245 0.267 0.024 0.336 0.209
Mid-size SUV 15168 404 2.7 0.380 0.001 0.383 0.377 0.379 0.006 0.397 0.364
Full-size SUV 6173 116 1.9 0.337 0.002 0.342 0.332 0.335 0.015 0.373 0.302
Mid-size pickup 6 4 66.7 0.256 0.068 0.441 0.127 0.259 0.056 0.463 0.126
Full-size pickup 43 0 0.0 0.313 0.033 0.383 0.224 0.305 0.035 0.383 0.196
Super-duty pickup 2 2 100.0 0.076 0.079 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
All 508701 12562 2.5 0.551 0.000 0.552 0.550 0.551 0.007 0.591 0.544
Notes: in columns (4)—(7) and (8)—(11) we report the descriptive statistics of the distribution of Gini coeﬃcient
calculated according to the ﬁrst and second procedures, see Section 3 for the description. The respective distributions
were obtained using 100 random drawings.
Table 2: Results obtained for cars registered on private persons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Class Number Gini coefficient (I) Gini coefficient (II)
Total Non-matched Non-matched, % mean st.dev max min mean st.dev max min
Microcar 121 0 0.0 0.191 0.011 0.228 0.170 0.176 0.036 0.276 0.117
City car 3541 176 5.0 0.433 0.003 0.441 0.426 0.427 0.017 0.473 0.391
Supermini 18293 371 2.0 0.413 0.001 0.414 0.411 0.412 0.008 0.430 0.393
Compact 109860 5599 5.1 0.518 0.001 0.520 0.517 0.518 0.011 0.557 0.490
Entry lux 68508 159 0.2 0.497 0.001 0.499 0.495 0.495 0.017 0.546 0.457
Mid-size 89882 865 1.0 0.533 0.001 0.536 0.530 0.533 0.014 0.569 0.501
Mid-size lux 59177 551 0.9 0.492 0.003 0.504 0.486 0.487 0.017 0.616 0.463
Full-size 1178 522 44.3 0.424 0.007 0.445 0.410 0.417 0.026 0.492 0.356
Full-size lux 5993 49 0.8 0.553 0.003 0.562 0.548 0.552 0.008 0.580 0.528
Sports (low) 622 26 4.2 0.403 0.005 0.418 0.390 0.402 0.022 0.442 0.338
Sports (mid) 151 4 2.6 0.311 0.010 0.336 0.286 0.313 0.017 0.363 0.280
Sports (high) 41 5 12.2 0.228 0.017 0.275 0.189 0.226 0.021 0.282 0.176
Sports (lux) 79 1 1.3 0.477 0.019 0.604 0.450 0.475 0.028 0.619 0.416
Super 2 0 0.0 0.192 0.075 0.352 0.151 0.200 0.081 0.352 0.151
Ponycar 114 3 2.6 0.355 0.017 0.404 0.311 0.350 0.035 0.433 0.264
Grand tourer 263 16 6.1 0.515 0.006 0.529 0.500 0.514 0.010 0.539 0.482
Convertible 3176 4 0.1 0.371 0.003 0.376 0.366 0.366 0.022 0.409 0.311
Roadster 412 3 0.7 0.331 0.007 0.347 0.314 0.328 0.015 0.380 0.299
LAV 1946 6 0.3 0.358 0.003 0.365 0.353 0.357 0.013 0.387 0.330
Mini MPV 3349 221 6.6 0.256 0.002 0.260 0.251 0.251 0.012 0.278 0.218
Compact MPV 9166 135 1.5 0.346 0.001 0.350 0.344 0.345 0.010 0.368 0.326
Large MPV 18855 1844 9.8 0.405 0.001 0.408 0.402 0.402 0.009 0.421 0.382
Full-size van 2056 58 2.8 0.397 0.004 0.405 0.388 0.391 0.024 0.448 0.320
LCV 6159 47 0.8 0.418 0.003 0.425 0.412 0.413 0.015 0.448 0.374
Mini SUV 1809 308 17.0 0.392 0.005 0.404 0.383 0.389 0.016 0.438 0.352
Compact SUV 11487 147 1.3 0.350 0.001 0.353 0.348 0.350 0.007 0.368 0.333
Coupe SUV 95 0 0.0 0.304 0.011 0.334 0.279 0.294 0.027 0.378 0.234
Mid-size SUV 9504 210 2.2 0.398 0.001 0.401 0.395 0.398 0.006 0.412 0.384
Full-size SUV 3101 80 2.6 0.382 0.003 0.388 0.376 0.381 0.017 0.425 0.349
Mid-size pickup 3 1 33.3 0.282 0.072 0.478 0.119 0.290 0.081 0.478 0.095
Full-size pickup 29 0 0.0 0.308 0.036 0.389 0.214 0.306 0.045 0.405 0.171
All 428972 11411 2.7 0.534 0.000 0.535 0.533 0.533 0.005 0.551 0.522
Notes: see Table 1.
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